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Introduction 
There are three major institutions that publish worldwide population projections: 
the United Nations Population Division, the US Bureau of the Census and the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). In the following analyses 
we will only use the most recent edition of the UN Population Assessments and 
Projections which was completed in November 1996. So far, these UN projections have 
not been officially published - but we had access to an internal data compendium 
("Annex I and 11") that will be included in the official publication. The final report of 
the 1996 UN population projections will be published in early 1997. 
We have, of course, also considered using the projections from the IIASA 
population program (Lutz, 1996) or that of the US Bureau of the Census (1996a). 
However, the IIASA population scenarios are only available for 13 very large world 
regions which are ecologically much too diverse for studying linkages between 
population and land or water resources. The projections of the US Bureau of the 
Census, on the other hand, are available for specific countries, but cover only the period 
from 1996 to 2020. This time-frame might be adequate from a methodological point of 
view, but is rather short for investigating resource constraints. The projections also do 
not include any indication about the range of uncertainty - such as a lower and higher 
variant or a probability range. Only the UN Population Assessments and Projections are 
available for all countries worldwide, include a higher and lower variant, and provide 
data series ranging from 1950 to 2050 which are long enough for bio-physical research. 
Moreover, only the UN population projections, which are now published every second 
year, have a history of more than four decades which makes it possible to assess their 
predictive accuracy. The World Bank, which formerly published its own projections 
(Vu, 1985) has canceled this activity and uses the UN data. 
1. Major Demographic Trends 
1.1 World population will grow significantly - in spite of falling fertility. 
There is one most striking paradox in global population trends: on one hand we 
have a rapid decline of fertility for more than two decades in many developing 
countries - not to speak about the already extremely low fertility in most highly 
developed nations; on the other hand we recently had the largest annual increase of 
world population in history. Between 1990 and 1995 each year some 85 million people 
were added to the world population. Why is this the case and what are recent estimates 
of fertility and population growth? 
According to the most recent UN assessment fertility - measured as a global 
average - began to decline in the mid-1970s. The world population, however will 
almost certainly continue to grow for several decades to come (see Figure 1). According 
to the UN medium variant projection we will most likely have a global population of 
about 9.4 billion by 2050. This is somewhat lower than the Population Division's 
previous estimate of 9.8 billion in the 1994 edition of the World Population Estimates. 
Even if one assumes extremely rapid worldwide fertility decline to an average of 
1.5 children per woman - which most demographers would consider highly unlikely - 
we would see a further increase of the world population up to about 7.6 billion people 
by 2050 (see UN low fertility variant). However, it is not impossible that the global 
population might increase to more than 11 billion by 2050. Please note that this "high" 
UN variant still assumes a worldwide fertility decline from currently 2.9 to about 2.6 
children per woman (see Figure 1 and Table 1). 
1.2 The current annual population increase of 80 million will probably remain 
constant until 2015. 
Currently world population is growing by about 80 million people per year (see 
Figure 2). This is a little less than in the early 1990s when the growth was more than 85 
million per year. According to the most recent UN medium variant projection this will 
not change much during the next decades. Only after 2015 will we observe a gradual 
decline. By 2050 - according to the UN medium variant - this annual increase of the 
world population will be down to "only" some 50 million. Thus, by the middle of the 
next century, world population growth (in absolute numbers) will have declined to the 
level of the early 1950s. However, this is only possible, if fertility - worldwide - falls to 
the so-called "reproductive level" of 2.1 children per woman by 2050. For countries 
like India, Pakistan or Nigeria that is a long way to go. 
It cannot be excluded that some populous countries will not reach this low fertility 
level by 2050. If - on average - worldwide fertility would decline to only 2.6 children 
per woman, world population growth would further increase. Between 2020 and 2050 
we would have a global annual population increase of about 100 million (see high 
variant UN projection in Figure 2). 
In the near future the current world population increase could only decline, if 
average fertility - worldwide - would fall to 1.6 (!) children per woman. There are not 
many demographers who would consider this level of fertility very likely. But only with 
such an extreme drop in fertility could we observe a shrinking of the world population 
after 2040 - assuming that there will be no disaster with a massive increase of mortality. 
1.3 Between now and 2050 world population growth will be generated exclusively 
in developing Countries. 
Between now and the year 2050 world population will most likely increase by some 
3.2 billion people - almost all of them will be contributed by the developing countries 
(see Table 2). In fact, the population of the developed nations as a group will most 
likely decline by almost 59 million people between 2025 and the year 2050. Comparing 
the centennial growth of developed and developing countries reveals a dramatic 
divergence: The developed countries as a group will have increased their population by 
less than 350 million between 1950 and 2050. The developing countries, on the other 
hand, will have added almost 6.5 billion people - thus almost quintupling their 1950 
population. 
This modern "population explosion" in the Third World - of course - is not 
comparable with anything we have experienced in the demographic transition of Europe 
during the 18" and 19" century. It is a historically unique phenomenon. Both the 
absolute numbers of population increase and the growth rates are without historical 
precedence. No country in Europe has experienced annual population growth rates of 
more than 0.5 to 1 percent during its "high growth" period. 
1.4 World population increase is concentrated in Asia. 
From the almost 3.7 billion people that will be added to the world population 
between now and 2050, Asia will contribute 2 billion (see Table 2). This enormous 
population increase of 2000 million people is due to the already massive size of the 
population. Most of this growth will happen in the next three decades. Between 1995 
and 2025 Asia's population will grow by 1.35 billion - between 2025 and 2050 the 
increase will be only 658 million (see Table 2). 
During the next three decades Africa will contribute another 734 million to the 
world population - some 15 million more than its current total population. Despite a 
projected increase in mortality due to AIDS we will not observe a significant slow 
down of population growth in Africa - not to speak about a decline. Fertility is still so 
high in Sub-Saharan Africa that it easily can offset the effect of rising (infant and adult) 
mortality. Latin America and the Caribbean, on the other hand, will have only a 
moderate population increase of some 213 million between 1995 and 2025. This is due 
to both the smaller initial size of the population and the significant decline of fertility. 
Europe's population will almost certainly decline. The UN medium variant projection 
assumes a shrinking by as much as 27 million during the next three decades. 
1.5 By far the highest population growth rates can be found in Africa. 
While Asia will contribute the largest number of people to modern world 
population growth, Africa will set the record in growth rates. In Table 2 we have 
calculated annual grow rates for various periods and all major regions of the world (we 
have used true exponential growth rates, so that periods of various length can be 
compared). 
Between now and the year 2025 Africa's population is projected to have a 
exponential annual growth rate of 0.44%, Latin America and the Caribbean will grow 
by 0.23%, Asia by 0.21%, and Northern America by 0.14%. Europe's population, most 
likely, will decline by 0.02%. 
Please note that these projected growth rates for the next 30 years are actually lower 
than the historical growth rates during the past 45 years. Between 1950 and 1995 Africa 
had a exponential annual growth rate of 0.49, Latin America and the Caribbean had 
0.44, Asia 0.38 and Northern America had 0.23. Even Europe had a positive growth 
rate of 0.12 (see Table 2). In other words - in the past 45 years Latin America grew 
twice as fast as it will grow in the next 30 years. We can also see that between 2025 and 
2050 the United Nations Population Division assumes much slower population growth 
than during the next 30 years. While Africa, for instance, is projected to have a growth 
rate of 0.44 between 1995 and 2025, it should be only 0.26 between 2025 and 2050. 
From a methodological point of few these growth rates for the second quarter of the 
next century are, of course, highly uncertain. But they show that the critical phase of 
world population growth is during the next three decades. If the world population will 
increase to only 9.3 billion people, then most of this growth will happen during the next 
30 years. If the growth rates will not be down significantly by 2025 we will have a 
much larger population in 2050. 
1.6 The ten countries which will contribute most to world population growth 
during the next 30 years are India, China, Pakistan, Nigeria, Ethiopia, 
Indonesia, United States of America, Bangladesh, Zaire and Iran - in that 
order! 
According to the most recent UN population projection India will add more than 
400 million to its population between 1995 and 2025 - China will grow by only 260 
million (see Table 3). The next largest contributor to world population growth - 
surprisingly - is not Indonesia with its third largest population among developing 
countries, but Pakistan. Pakistan will grow by about 133 million between 1995 and 
2025. An almost equal contribution to world population growth will probably come 
from Nigeria - 127 million. Perhaps unexpected, the next largest contributor to world 
population growth will be Ethiopia, which will add another 80 million people. 
Indonesia, on the other hand, will grow by "only" 78 million - which is only rank six in 
the "hit list'' of contributors to world population growth. The United States will 
probably grow by 65 million and Bangladesh by 62 million. Few development experts 
would have put Zaire on a watch list for population problems. But the population in this 
Central African country is projected to grow by more than 60 million. The tenth largest 
contributor to world population growth will be Iran - with a population increase of 
almost 60 million between 1995 and 2025 (see Table 3). 
1.7 India will out-grow China. 
India has one of the oldest family planning programs. It started way back in the 
1950s. The country's average fertility, however, declined only slowly. In the early 
1950s both China and India had a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of about 6 children per 
woman. But while China's TFR sharply fell to about 2.4 in 1990, it declined only 
slowly in India and was still above 4 children per woman in 1990. This relatively slow 
decline of fertility has built up a huge population momentum in India. The country's 
population structure is much "younger" than that of China. These young adults - born 
during the high growth period in the 1950s, 1960s and even 1970s - will have children 
in the near future. Even if fertility continues to decline to reproductive level by 2020 (as 
being assumed by the UN projections) the Indian population will probably increase to 
almost 1.6 billion by 2050 - slightly more than that of China (UN medium variant) (see 
Figure 3). However, India's population might become even much larger. If the average 
Total Fertility Rate would only decline to 2.6 (instead of 2.1) children per woman in 
2020, the population would increase to about 1.9 billion (!) by 2050 (see high UN 
variant in Figure 3). 
1.8 Nigeria and Pakistan: emerging population giants. 
There are not many countries in the world where population projections are more 
difficult to believe than in Nigeria. If the latest UN projections are correct then our 
children (and the younger among us) will watch the emergence of an African 
population giant, well comparable to the most populous Asian nations. In 1950 the 
West-African country had a population of about 33 million; since then the population 
has more than tripled. The UN Population Division estimates that Nigeria's population 
in 1995 was about 112 million (please note that the UN does not revise their estimate 
according to the most recent Nigerian census, which was significantly lower. 
Obviously, the UN Population and Statistical Divisions do not consider this census 
accurate enough). Between now and the year 2050 the country's population will 
probably triple again and reach almost 339 million (see Figure 4). If that really happens 
we will have a ten-fold increase of a 33 million population within one century. This 
would have no historical precedence. Please note that we are talking about the medium 
variant UN projection. Based on the demographic parameters it would be not 
impossible if Nigeria's population would grow even faster. 
There are other overwhelmingly Muslim populations with very high population 
growth rates, such as those of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or the United Arab Emirates. But 
none of them is projected to have such a massive absolute increase of the population as 
Pakistan. In 1950 Pakistan had a population of about 40 million people - and was quite 
comparable in population size to Bangladesh (42 million), Brazil (54 million) or - for 
instance - Italy (39 million). Since then Pakistan's population has more than tripled and 
stood at 136 million in 1995. At that time Brazil was 159 million, Bangladesh 118 
million and Italy 57 million. But the real population explosion in Pakistan will come 
during the next few decades. The population not only has a very large proportion of 
young men and women in reproductive age, but also still extremely high fertility - 
much higher, for instance, than in Bangladesh or Brazil. These young couples will 
produce a large number of children even if we assume, as in the UN medium variant, a 
decline of average fertility to reproductive level (of 2.1 children per woman) by 2020. 
Pakistan's population will be about 357 million by 2050 (according to the UN medium 
variant projection) - far larger than that of Bangladesh (218 million), Brazil (243 
million) or, of course, Italy (42 million) (see Figure 4). However, it is 
(demographically) not impossible, that Pakistan's population increases even further to 
some 413 million by 2050 (UN high variant projection). 
High fertility in the early 1950 was not the only reason for the exceptional 
population growth of Nigeria and Pakistan. There were other countries which had a 
similar or even higher level of fertility. Consider the case of Bangladesh and Thailand. 
The Total Fertility Rate in Bangladesh during the early 1970 was as high as in Nigeria 
or Pakistan and the initial population size was quite comparable. Yet Bangladesh is 
projected to have a population of "only" 220 million by 2050 (as compared to Nigeria's 
339 million). Thailand is one of the Asian "success stories" in population control. The 
average TFR was as high as in Nigeria but declined sharply since the 1970s. As a result 
Thailand will have a very moderate population increase between now and 2050 of only 
some 14.7 million (see Figure 4). 
1.9 The global balance of population has shifted significantly between 1950 and 
1995. It will change even more dramatically between now and 2050. 
Europe's share of the world population has sharply declined from 21.7 in 1950 to 
12.8 percent in 1995. Africa's share, on the other hand, has increased from 8.9 to 12.7% 
(see Table 4). Today, both Europe and Africa are each home of about one eighth of the 
world population. This will change significantly in the future. Europe's share of the 
global population will shrink to about 6.8 percent in 2050. Africa's share will grow to 
2 1.8 percent. Hence, one century of population growth will completely reverse Europe's 
and Africa's position: Europe's share of the global population in 2050 will be the same 
as that of Africa in 1950 - and vice versa. If the UN medium variant projections turn 
out to be correct (and there is no sign that they may be utterly wrong) we have to expect 
a dramatic change in the global balance of population: A much bigger share of the 
world population will live in Africa-South-of-the-Sahara. In only some 50 years 
Western Africa, for instance, will have the same population as all of Europe and 
Eastern Africa will have much more people than all countries of South America, the 
Caribbean and Oceania combined. 
1.10 World-wide, the population will age. 
During the next decades the world population structure will inevitably age. This is 
an unavoidable consequence of large birth cohorts during the 1950s and 1960s and the 
rapid fertility decline since the 1970s. In 2025 the "baby boomers" of the 1950s and 60s 
will be between 65 and 75 years of age. These large aging cohorts are followed by the 
relatively small "baby bust" generations of the worldwide fertility decline. 
In 1950 there were only 131 million people of age 65 and older; in 1995 the 
number of elderly had tripled - it was estimated at 371 million. Between now and the 
year 2025 it will more than double again, and by 2050 we might have more than 1.4 
billion elderly worldwide (see Table 5). In 1950 only 5.2 percent of the world 
population were of age 65 or more - today the percentage has already increased to 6.2 
and by 2025 one out of ten people worldwide will be 65 years of age or more. 
While currently population aging is most serious in Europe and Japan, Eastern Asia 
(China) will experience a dramatic increase in the proportion of elderly people by the 
middle of the next century. This is largely due to the country's success in family 
planning, which rapidly reduced the relative size of birth cohorts since the 1970s. 
2. The Demographic Momentum 
As we have demonstrated with the projections above there is almost no doubt that 
the world population will grow for quite some time. Of course we can imagine massive 
natural catastrophes, such as the world being hit by a huge meteor; we can also think 
about the emergence of a highly contagious lethal virus for which no cure or 
immunization can be found; or we could be frightened about a worldwide nuclear war 
that might result in sudden, non-reversible climate change - but short of these highly 
unlikely events almost nothing could stop the global population from increasing another 
few billion people. Why are we so sure about this? 
First, there is a driving force concealed in the "young" age structure of the world 
population that just cannot be switched off. Due to high fertility in the 1950s, 1960s 
and 1970s in many developing countries large numbers of women (and men) are 
currently entering reproductive age. The world is full of young adults that will have 
children. Even if each couple has a smaller number of children than their parents the 
total number of offsprings will be substantial. This "echo effect" of a high-fertility 
period in the past creates a "demographic momentum" which works against changes 
in reproductive behavior that favor smaller families. 
Second, it is highly unlikely that large populations will instantly change their 
reproductive behavior. Certain sections of a population, such as highly educated 
middle-class couples in urban areas, might adopt radical behavioral change almost 
overnight, but many developing countries still have large rural populations where 
fertility is linked to deep-rooted cultural values or social conditions and can decline 
only gradually over two or three generations. We must also take into account that the 
average fertility of a population is a composite measure which results from the 
reproductive behavior of several parent cohorts: these include couples which already 
have a certain number of children and can only reduce the number of additional 
offspring. Even in a country like China, where we have a highly controlled society 
and a most rigorous family planning program, it took 20 years to reduce average 
fertility from about 6 to 2.4 children. In India - according to UN projections - this 
process might take 60 years or more. 
These two basic facts, which are well known among demographers, tend to slow 
down demographic change. They can produce a considerable time-lag between the first 
signs of a fertility decline and a slow down of population growth. In fact, it is quite 
typical for developing countries that the total number of births increases for one or even 
two decades, while the fertility (that is the average number of children per woman) 
already declines. Consider Figure 2 in which we have plotted global population growth 
together with the change in Total Fertility Rates (TFR) - as being derived from the 1996 
round of UN Population Assessments and Projections. Please note that between 1950 
and 1995 the chart is based on (estimates of) historical data, while from 1995 to 2050 
both the total population and the TFR are projections. Globally, the TFR dropped from 
about 5 children per woman in 1950 to some 2.9 in 1995; during that same period world 
population more than doubled from 2.5 to 5.2 billion. The UN assumes a further steep 
decline of fertility to 2.1 children in 2050. During that period the world population will 
further increase to 9.3 billion people. 
Between 1965 and 1995, while the TFR dropped significantly, the annual increase 
of the world population grew from about 65 to 85 million. In other words, more and 
more people were added to the global population, while couples had less and less 
children (see Figure 2). 
These contrary trends become even more apparent when we plot indices of the 
Total Fertility Rate, the average annual increase of the population and the annual 
population growth rates. For the five-year period of 1950-55 the indices are set to 100 
(see Figure 5). This "paradox" is simply a consequence of the fact that the increase in 
the number of parents outpaced the decline in fertility. In fact this situation will 
continue for some time. According to the most recent UN projections we will have a 
stable annual increase of about 80 million people until 2015 - only then will this 
increase gradually decline to about 47 million in 2050. By the middle of the next 
century the world population will still grow by about the same number of people as in 
1950 - only the total number of people on the planet will be more than three times 
larger. 
3. What do we not know about future population growth? 
We know that fertility is declining almost everywhere. But we do not know how 
fast and to which level it will fall. There is not much indication that some Islamic 
countries, such as Pakistan or the Gulf states in Western Asia, will have significantly 
lower fertility in the near future. On the other hand there are signs that fertility is 
dropping even faster than expected in several other Asian and even African countries. 
This would result in a smaller world population than previously expected. Some 
researchers even believe that the global population could stabilize somewhat below 10 
billion people in the long run ( I ~ t z ,  1996). Of course, this - to a large extent - is based 
on educated speculation, since it depends on assumptions about changes in reproductive 
behavior of people who are not even born today. There is great controversy among 
demographers whether these assumptions can be justified: some highly respected demo- 
graphers, such as Nathan Keyfitz or Joel E. Cohen have argued that population 
projections are impossible beyond 10 or 15 years (Keyfitz, 198 1; Cohen, 1995). Others 
have applied sophisticated methodologies such as probabilistic projections to calculate 
even very long-term projections (or scenarios) up to the year 2100 (Lutz, 1996). Those 
who have regularly conducted world population projections for more than 3 decades - 
such as the UN Population Division - can argue that their projections were fairly 
accurate if compared with the actual development (see Table 5). 
The debate is still undecided. The only thing we know for sure is that there is a 
high degree of uncertainty for any projection that expands over more than 2 or 3 
decades. One reason for this uncertainty is the high sensitivity of long-term projections 
to different assumptions on the timing and speed of the fertility decline. Even if all 
demographers would agree that fertility will come down to 2.1 children per woman in 
2050 (which is the current UN assumption) a few years delay in this decline or a 
somewhat slower pace can make a difference for the world population of several billion 
people. 
So far we have only talked about fertility. Of course this is a crude simplification. 
The real trouble begins when we take into account future changes in mortality. It was 
conventional wisdom among demographers for quite some time that mortality is not a 
very important issue when it comes to population projections: the developing countries 
would simply follow the trends in the developed world which were thought to have 
already stabilized. The lowest level of infant mortality would be around 10 deaths per 
1000 life births and the maximum life expectancy would be about 82.5 years for men 
and 87.5 years for women (this was the UN assumption since their 1988 round of 
projections). However, things have changed unexpectedly: 
First, there is an ongoing decline in mortality in many developed countries. 
Especially adult and old-age mortality is falling quite significantly for both men and 
women. Average life expectancy in some of these populations (such as in Austria) 
has increased by about 2 years per decade during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. A 
growing number of people are approaching ages that were previously considered a 
biological upper limit of the human life span. Micro-biological and genetic research 
has made a big step forward to understand (and possibly manipulate) the process of 
aging. It is not impossible that human life can be significantly expanded in the future 
by a combination of dietary practices, specific drugs and genetic therapy. 
Second, the expected across-the-board decline of mortality in the developing world 
has not materialized. While some developing countries, such as China, have seen a 
spectacular increase in life expectancy, others have lagged behind or, in fact, have 
even experienced recent declines. Especially for Africa-South-of-the-Sahara 
previous assumptions might have been overoptimistic - given the high prevalence of 
HIV-infection and AIDS, newly spreading tropical diseases and widespread violent 
conflicts. 
Both trends have added uncertainty to our population projections - or rather made 
us aware of the uncertainty that was already there. While the prospects of increasing 
longevity among highly developed populations might only amplify their structural 
problems of aging, it is the new threat from AIDS and other causes in developing 
countries which could have a significant impact on world population growth. So far this 
is not in sight, but no one knows the future of the AIDS epidemic in India or other 
populous Asian countries. There is indication, for instance, that HIV infection is 
spreading rapidly in India and Thailand (US Bureau of the Census, 1996b). 
The best strategy for reducing this uncertainty in population projections is to 
regularly revise the estimates, based on most recent demographic evidence. The UN 
Population Division has an excellent record for continuously fine-adjusting their 
estimates. Also, their early estimates from the 1960s seem to have been remarkably 
accurate for the year 2000 (see Table 5). 
4. Estimating the balance of remaining land with cultivation potential 
In this section we discuss to what extent the availability of land resources in the less 
developed countries can be expected to support the unprecedented population growth 
that will occur over the next 2 to 3 decades in many regions. The aim is to estimate the 
amount of land that from climatic, edaphic and topographic conditions may be adjudged 
the capability to sustain food crop production. Furthermore, we are interested in the 
relative quality of these lands, their broad geographic distribution as well as the major 
type of ecosystems that presently cover these areas. 
The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), together with IIASA, has 
developed and widely applied a methodological framework for assessments of land 
productivity which originally was designed for use in agricultural development 
planning and natural resources management (FAO, 1978-81; FAOIIIASA, 1993; 
Fischer & van Velthuizen, 1996). A first assessment comparing crop production 
potential to minimum food requirements concluded that, overall, less developed regions 
would be able to feed their growing populations (FAO/IIASA/UNFPA, 1982). Agro- 
ecological zoning (AEZ) involves the inventory, characterization and classification of 
the land resources in a way meaningful for assessments of the potential of agricultural 
production systems. This characterization of land resources includes components of 
climate, soils and landform, basic for the supply of water, energy, nutrients and physical 
support to plants. 
Crops require heat, light and water in varying amounts. The geographic distribution 
of crops is mainly governed by these climatic elements. Temperature, water and solar 
radiation are key climatic parameters which condition the net photosynthesis and allow 
crops to accumulate dry matter according to the rates and patterns which are specific to 
individual crop species. Crops have specific temperature requirements for their growth 
and development, and prevailing temperatures set the limits of crop performance when 
moisture (and radiation) requirements are met. Vice versa, when temperature 
requirements are met, the growth of a crop is largely dependent on how well the length 
of its growth cycle matches the period when water is available. In the AEZ approach, 
this has led to the concept of the length-of-growing-period (1,GP) which is defined as 
the period (in days) during the year in which water availability and prevailing 
temperature can sustain crop growth. 
Crop performance depends as well on the availability of nutrients in the soil, its 
capacity to store water and to provide mechanical support for crops. Therefore, agro- 
ecological zoning also includes an inventory of relevant soil and landform 
characteristics. The specific combinations of climatic, soil and terrain inventories form 
the basic land resources units of analysis. 
Technical specifications (including management) within a socio-economic setting 
under which a specific crop is grown have been defined as land utilization types (LUT). 
Crop suitability assessments, in essence, are based on matching of crop specific 
adaptability characteristics and LUT ecological requirements with the attributes of 
individual land units. 
4.1 Estimating the extent of land with crop production potential 
To estimate the scope for expanding agriculture in response to population growth in 
developing countries and to assess the possible impact on forest ecosystems of 
increasing the extents of cultivated land a rather detailed assessment of land resources 
and land with rainfed cultivation potential was carried out at IIASA to provide inputs to 
a F A 0  study World Agriculture: Towards 201 0 (FAO, 1995). Some of the calculation 
steps were recently repeated using additional data and procedures, involving five main 
steps: quantifying land with cultivation potential; delineation of protected areas; 
subtracting land for habitation and infrastructure; overlaying of global ecosystems 
database; subtraction of land currently in cultivation. 
The input for the evaluation of land with rainfed crop production potential consists 
of several geo-referenced data-sets: (a) the inventory of soil and land form 
characteristics from the FAO-UNESCO Soil Map of the World (SMW) (FAO, 1991); 
and (b) the inventory of climate regimes in which data on temperature, rainfall, relative 
humidity, wind speed and global radiation are used together with information on 
evapotranspiration, to characterize the thermal regimes and length of growing periods. 
The digitized inventories were overlaid to create a land resources inventory composed 
of several hundred thousands of land units, i.e., pieces of land of varying size with 
unique soil, land form and climate attributes. 
Each land unit was tested for its suitability to grow any of the selected 21 major 
agricultural crops, under three levels of technology. (The crops are: millet, sorghum, 
maize, spring wheat, winter wheat, barley, bunded rice, upland rice, sweet potato, 
cassava, white potato, phaseolus bean, groundnut, soybean, cowpea, chickpea, oil palm, 
sugarcane, banana, olive and cotton.) 
The estimated yields for each land unit, crop and technology alternative were then 
compared with those obtainable under the same major climate zone but without soil and 
terrain constraints, the latter yields being termed the maximum constraint-free yield. 
Any piece of land so tested, or part thereof, is classified as suitable for rainfed crop 
production if at least one of the crops could be grown under any one of the three 
technology alternatives with a yield of 20 percent or more of the maximum constraint- 
free yield for that management level. If more than one crop met this criterion, the 
amount of land classified as suitable was determined on the basis of the crop which 
could use the largest part of the land unit. Land units where none of the 21 crops met 
this criterion were classified as not suitable (NS) for rainfed crop production. 
The land assessed as having potential for rainfed crop production is further 
classified into three broad suitability classes. When simulated crop yields were within 
80 to 100 percent of maximum constraint-free yield the land was classified as very 
suitable (VS); suitable (S) when within 40 to 80 percent; and marginally suitable (MS) 
when assessed yield levels were between 20 to 40 percent. For presentation of results 
we consider five aggregate land classes, based on the combination of moisture 
conditions and crop suitability, as used by F A 0  (1988, 1995): 
Low rainfall class (LOW): dry semi-arid areas with length of growing periods 
of 75 to 120 days, all suitable soils; 
Uncertain rainfall class (UNC): moist semi-arid areas with LGP of 120 to 180 
days and very suitable (VS) or suitable (S) land; 
Good rainfall class (GOOD): Sub-humid areas with LGP of 180 to 270 days and 
very suitable (VS) or suitable (S) land; 
Problem area class (PROB): includes VS, S and MS land in humid and per- 
humid regions (with LGP > 270 days), and 
moderately suitable (MS) land in LGPs of 120 to 
270 days; 
Naturally flooded class (NFL): includes all suitable land where soils are classified 
as Fluvisols or Gleysols. 
4.2 Delineation of protected areas 
When land is indicated as legally defined protected (national parks, conservation 
forest and wildlife reserves) the respective land units are evaluated for cultivation 
potential but not considered available for agricultural expansion. In the study, the 
relevant data were available for 63 of the developing countries. Maps and inventories of 
National Parks, Conservation Forest and Wildlife Reserves (IUCN, 1990) were made 
available by the World Conservation and Monitoring Centre (Cambridge, UK) and 
provided to IIASA by the FAO. The data on protected areas are georeferenced and thus 
could be overlayed on the land resources inventory. These areas delineated in the GIs  
occupy a total of almost 400 million ha, i.e., about 6 percent of the total land area in 
developing countries (excluding China). Of this, around 200 million ha were assessed 
as having some potential for crop cultivation representing about 8 percent of the total 
extent with crop cultivation potential. 
4.3 Subtraction of land for habitation and infrastructure 
We have also attempted to broadly estimate the amount of land currently used for 
habitation and infrastructure occupying areas assessed as having cultivation potential 
(Heilig, 1994). Detailed information to estimate region specific land use for these 
purposes is scarce. The functional relationship parameterized in the study relies mainly 
on county-level data from China. It expresses per capita use of land for habitation and 
infrastructure in relation to population density. Examples of the parameterization are as 
follows: at 35 persons per km2 the simulated requirement is 50 ha per 1000 people 
(hence 1.75 percent of the land), at 150 persons per km2 the use is 26 ha per 1000 
people (i.e., 3.9 percent of the land), at 675 persons per km2 the use is 20 ha per 1000 
persons (some 13.5 percent of the land), etc. Based on a georeferenced dataset of 
population density the respective subtraction of land for habitation and infrastructure 
purposes is carried out in each land unit. 
4.4 Overlaying of global ecosystems database on the land with cultivation potential 
To estimate the distribution of ecosystems among land assessed as having rainfed 
crop production potential a global ecosystems digital database (Kineman & 
Ohrenschall, 1992). was overlayed with the land resources data. The dataset is coded on 
a lo' by lo' latitudellongitude raster of grid-cells providing an adequate resolution for 
regional studies. 60 ecosystems classes are distinguished in the dataset which were 
aggregated into 12 aggregate land-cover categories as shown in Appendix A. 
The GIs  operation overlaying the results of the agro-ecological assessment with the 
global ecosystems database was tabulated by country to derive the distribution of 
ecosystems within land classes with cultivation potential. Tabulation of land resources 
both by detailed and aggregate classes has been carried out. For presentation here, the 
results were then further aggregated according to broader geographic regions. 
4.5 Subtraction of land currently under cultivation 
The steps previously described resulted in geographically explicit accounts of land 
with cultivation potential characterized in terms of major ecosystems classes. Finally, to 
subtract from these the land areas currently under cultivation two main data sources 
were relied upon: a digital copy of the accounts of cultivated land compiled by F A 0  
(1995; data in Appendix 5), and the distribution of farmland ecosystem classes found in 
the global ecosystems database. It includes 10 ecosystems classes of pure or mixed 
agricultural use which were merged into 3 aggregated land-cover categories. We 
anticipate that activities currently underway by the International Geosphere-Biosphere 
Programme (IGBP) to develop high resolution global datasets on land cover and 
elevation (Townshend, 1992) will help to improve the accuracy of our estimation. 
Regional land balances of areas with cultivation potential obtained by applying the 
5-step procedure previously described are presented in Appendix B, a summary for all 
less developed countries is shown in Table 6 (for an explanation of table entries refer to 
Table 6B in Appendix B). 
5. How well do land and water resources match the anticipated regional 
population momentum 
As a first check to what extent the balance of remaining land with cultivation 
potential would enable the various regions to cope with the demographic trends outlined 
in sections 1 to 3, demand for arable land was estimated under crude assumptions for 
projected year 2030 and 2050 population levels. In the simplest case it is assumed that1: 
(a) the additional demand for cultivated land increases linearly with population; (b) 
only a fraction, overall in the order of 20 percent but varying with region, of the 
additional agricultural output needed will have to be met from expanding cultivated 
land. In specifying this fraction, we have broadly adopted the assumptions of F A 0  
(1995) (see Table 7). For instance, in Sub-Saharan Africa about 30 percent of the 
I Of course, both these assumptions can be contested with regard to their nature as well as the parameterization 
used. 
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contribution to total crop production increases is assumed to be derived from expansion 
of cultivated land. For land-scarce Asian regions this is assumed to be only about 5 
percent. 
Table 8 summarizes the calculations using population levels projected for years 
2030 and 2050 (UN, 1997). The share of production increases not accounted for by 
expanding cultivated land would have to come from intensification, i.e., higher yields, 
reduced fallow periods and a larger number of crops per year. Table 8 compares, for 
groups of countries in less developed regions, the additional need for cultivated land 
estimated under these assumptions to the balance of land potentially available. Even 
under these very mild conditions the populous region of South-central Asia and the 
land-scarce Western Asia region are not likely to have enough suitable land resources to 
meet even only 5 to 10 percent of the required production increases from expansion of 
cultivated land, Western Africa reaching close to the limits. 
Land cover change, in particular deforestation, has been identified as a key factor 
contributing to global environmental change (Turner et al., 1993). Alterations of the 
carbon pools, changes in albedo and the balance of sensible and latent heat fluxes, the 
impacts on total runoff and runoff speed, and the concern about loss of ecological 
complexity and biodiversity have prompted the international research community to 
focus their attention on the impacts of land-use and land cover change (Turner et al., 
1995; Fischer et al., 1996). It is therefore of interest to assess the balance of land 
remaining when setting aside land with crop production potential which is currently 
covered by ecologically highly valued ecosystems such as forest or wetland ecosystems. 
If this condition were to be strictly applied, six out of eleven developing regions would 
not be able to meet the stipulated increases in cultivated land, as forests and wetlands 
cover on average about two thirds of the balance of land with cultivation potential. 
A detailed discussion of water resources availability and future water use is beyond 
the scope of this paper. In the past, various studies have been devoted to the subject of 
water resources such as the work by Baumgartner & Reichel (1975), L'vovich (1979), 
Shiklomanov & Markova (1987), Falkenmark (1989), and Shiklomanov (1990). A 
comprehensive analysis and collection of data is contained in Gleick (1993). 
Kulshreshtha (1993) considers several scenarios of future water demand and supply at 
national level. 
As a crude measure of regional vulnerability with respect to water resources, we 
look at the regional levels of annual renewable freshwater water resources available per 
capita, and their change with respect to altered population levels. Countries are grouped 
into three broad categories with regard to the availability of water resources. Water 
experts suggest that regions with an annual renewable freshwater water resource of less 
than 1000 m3/caplyear should be regarded as water scarce. When water supply ranges 
between 1000 to 2000 m3lcaplyear water stress is likely to occur. Only at levels 
exceeding 2000 m3lcaplyear regions are considered to have abundant water supplies. 
Data reported by the World Resources Institute (WRI, 1996) and population levels 
projected by the UN (UN, 1997) were used to flag regions where population pressure 
may results in water stress as defined above. Table 9 shows results of such classification 
for both developed and developing regions. In 1995, three of the less developed 
regions, namely Northern Africa, Southern Africa, and Western Asia are considered to 
experience water scarcity or stress. By 2030 this number increases to six, adding 
Eastern Africa, South-central Asia and Eastern Asia. Western Africa would join the 
ranks of water stressed regions between 2030 to 2050. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have reviewed what is known and expected about future 
population development. Regional differences in demographic change were presented 
and population increase was compared with estimates of land and water resources 
availability. From this analysis some key conclusions can be drawn: 
The 1996 UN Population Estimates and Projections indicate a 65 percent increase in 
world population between 1995 to 2050. 
Population numbers in developed regions will, in the aggregate, approximately 
remain at the current level. All the growth will occur in less developed countries, 
increasing their numbers by more than 80 percent. 
There is also a wide variation of projected population increases among less 
developed regions. The largest increases, in percentage terms, between 1995 to 
2050 are projected for Sub-Saharan African regions, namely in Middle Africa 
(240%), Eastern Africa (215%) and Western Africa (205%). These are followed by 
Western Asia (130%) and Southern Africa (125%). In absolute terms, however, the 
largest increase will occur in South-central Asia, an addition of some 1.15 billion 
people during the projected 55 years. 
Most of the population growth will already occur until year 2030. While there are 
many uncertainties involved when projecting demographic changes to 2050 and 
beyond, the projection methods are fairly robust and show little variation when 
applied to the next 2 to 3 decades. 
An assessment of the extent of land with rainfed cultivation potential has concluded 
that land resources in less developed regions could allow crop production on some 
2.5 billion hectares. An estimated 900 million hectares have been under cultivation 
at around 1990, leaving a balance of 1.6 billion hectares. Some 30 percent of these 
extents are adjudged only marginal suitability due to severe soil and landform 
limitations, excessive wetness conditions or drought hazard. 
The distribution of land resources is rather uneven. Of the 1.6 billion hectares of the 
balance of land with potential for rainfed crop production almost half (47%) is 
located in Latin America, some 45% in Africa, and only 8% in Asia. 
Overall, it is estimated that two thirds of the balance of land with rainfed cultivation 
potential is currently covered by various forest ecosystems, wetlands and 
mangroves. The respective percentages by region vary between 23% in Southern 
Africa to 89% in South-eastern Asia. For Latin America and Asia the estimated 
share of the balance of land with cultivation potential under forest and wetland 
ecosystems is about 70 percent, in Africa this is about 60%. If these were to be 
preserved, the remaining balance of land with some potential for rainfed crop 
cultivation would amount to 550 million hectares. 
In addition to the uneven spread of land and water resources time is an important 
factor as well. The rapid population growth during the next 3 decades will leave 
little time to develop land and water resources along a sustainable path. 
The regions which will experience the largest difficulties in meeting future demand 
for land resources and water, or alternatively have to cope with much increased 
dependency on external supplies, can clearly be identified from our analysis. These 
include foremost Western Asia, South-central Asia, and Northern Africa. A large 
stress on resources is to be expected also in many countries of Eastern, Western and 
Southern Africa (Heilig, 1996). 
Recent initiatives to establish global monitoring and observation systems as well as 
national and international programmes to study the driving forces and impacts of land- 
use and land-cover changes will result in much improved information that will allow to 
assess the conditions and prospects for expanding food production more precisely than 
was possible here. Our analysis demonstrates that such understanding is of utmost 
importance and urgency. 
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Figure 1: Total World Population, 1950-2050 (in billion) and Average Number of Children 
per Women (Total Fertility Rate). High, Medium and Low Variant UN Projections, 1996. 
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Figure 2: Average Annual World Population Increase (in million) and Average Number of 
Children per Women (Total Fertility Rate). High, Medium and Low Variant UN Projections, 
1996. 
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Table 1: Total Population by Region in 1950, 1995, 2025 and 2050 (in 1000). Low, Medium 
and High Variant UN Projection, 1996. 
Source: United Nations Population Division (1997): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. The 1996 
Edition. Annexes I and 11. New York 
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Table 2: Population Increase (in 1000) and in Exp. Annual Growth Rate (in %) by Region 
between 1950-1995, 1995-2025, 2025-2050 and 1950-2050. UN Medium Variant Projection, 
1996. 
Note: The exponential growth rate was calculated with the formula: r = (log(Pn / Po)) / n log e 
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Source: United Nations Population Division (1997): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. The 1996 
Edition. Annexes I and 11. New York 
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Table 3: The 10 Countries with the Highest Population Increase between 1950-1995, 1995- 
2025, 2025-2050 and 1950-2050. UN Medium Variant Projection, 1996. 
Past Population Increase, Projected Population Increase, 
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United States of America 65.366 
Bangladesh 61,751 
Zaire 60,472 
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 59,886 
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United States of America 189,730 
Brazil 189,284 
Bangladesh 176,405 
lran (Islamic Republic of) 153.356 
Edition. Annexes I and 11. N& York 
Figure 3: China and India: Total Population 1950-2050 (in billion). Low, Medium and High 
Variant UN Projection, 1996. 
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Source: United Nations Population Division (1997): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. The 1996 
Edition. Annexes I and 11. New York 
Figure 4: Nigeria, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Thailand: Total Population 1950-2050 (in 
million) and Average Number of Children per Women (Total Fertility Rate). High, Medium 
and Low Variant UN Projections, 1996. (All Chart have the same scales) 
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Table 4: Total Population (in 1000) and Proportion of Global Population by Region (in 
%), 1950, 1995, 2025 and 2050. Medium Variant UN Projection, 1996. 
I Total Population (in 1000) I Percentaae of World ~ o o . 1  
World Total 1 2.523.878 5,687,113 8,039,130 9,366,7241 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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Source: United Nations Population Division (1997): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. The 1996 
Table 7: Sources of growth in crop production and in harvested area, in developing countries, 
excluding China (%). 
Source: F A 0  (1995), Table 4.8, p.170. 
Table 8: A simple balance of cultivated land in year 2050 (1000 ha) 










Source: Calculation by authors based on F A 0  (1995). 
Table 5: Total Number (in 1000) and Proportion of Elderly (in percent of total population) 
by Region in 1950, 1995,2025 and 2050. UN Medium Variant Projection, 1996. 
Source: United Nations Population Division (1997): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. The 1996 
Edition. Annexes I and 11. New York 
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Table 6: Balance of land with rainfed crop production potential in less developed regions 
Source: Calculation by authors based on FA0 (1995) 
Population Age 65+ (in 1000) 
1950 1995 2025 2050 
130.669 370,707 801.929 1,415,924 
64,052 157.950 246.503 287,373 
66.617 212.757 555,427 1,128,551 
7.058 22.702 61,211 161.408 
1.915 6,121 15,601 46.282 
999 2,606 6.236 17.220 
1.844 6.104 17,749 42,302 
565 2,014 5,299 12,112 
1.736 5.856 16,326 43.491 
6,220 24.171 66,425 135.362 
760 2.376 5,214 9.233 
1.498 5.123 15,815 36,968 
3.963 16.671 45.395 89.161 
14.102 37.080 68.367 82.550 
57.384 183,427 458,581 863.449 
29,978 96.559 225.266 345,838 
6.774 20,712 56,393 124,734 
18.428 58,757 155.694 345,205 
2,204 7.399 21,229 47.671 
44,981 100.620 141.764 164,798 
14,287 38.201 50.967 59,786 
8,045 14,343 19.323 21.645 
8,303 20.913 30,810 37,085 
14,347 27.163 40.665 46,282 
930 2.724 5,601 8.384 
839 2,504 4.948 6.717 
82 182 532 1,375 
3 15 52 126 
6 24 70 165 
6,521 17.658 45,543 124.915 
Population Age 65+) 
As % of Total Population 
1950 1995 2025 2050 
5.2 6.5 10.0 15.1 
7.9 13.5 20.2 24.7 
3.9 4.7 8.1 13.8 
3.2 3.2 4.2 7.9 
2.9 2.8 3.2 6.6 
3.8 3.1 3.3 6.0 
3.5 3.9 6.9 13.3 
3.6 4.3 6.4 11.3 
2.7 2.8 3.7 6.8 
3.7 5.1 9.6 16.7 
4.5 6.7 10.8 16.4 
4.1 4.1 8.4 16.0 
3.5 5.3 10.0 17.0 
8.2 12.5 18.5 21.5 
4.1 5.3 9.6 15.9 
4.5 6.8 13.3 20.1 
3.7 4.3 8.2 15.4 
3.7 4.3 7.4 13.7 
4.4 4.4 7.1 12.3 
8.2 13.8 20.2 25.8 
6.5 12.3 17.9 23.4 
10.3 15.4 20.2 23.0 
7.6 14.6 22.5 30.9 
10.2 15.0 22.1 27.6 
7.4 9.6 13.8 18.4 
8.3 11.7 17.2 22.0 
3.9 3.1 5.2 10.6 
2.0 3.1 6.1 11.5 
2.5 4.1 8.0 15.6 
3.3 3.0 3.9 7.7 













Source: Data compiled by authors based on WRI (1996) and UN (1997). 
Appendix 1 : Global ecosystems database (dataset WE1.4D) 
The first column indicates the global ecosystems class (Kineman&Ohrenschall, 1992), the 
second column the aggregation index used in the study. Class levels not listed are not used in 
the classification. 
# WORLD ECOSYSTEMS (WE1.4D) 
NR IA P NAME EXPLANATION 
0 11 8 WAT Waters, including ocean and inland waters 
1 10 6 CCX City complexes 
2 2 3 SSG Short or sparse grass/shrub of semiarid climates 
6 4 4 TBE Temperate/tropical montane broadleaf evergreen forest 
8 1 9 DMB Desert, mostly bare stone, clay or sand 
16 3 3 BES Broadleaf evergreen scrub (commonly with #46 and #47) 
17 11 9 ICE Antarctic ice, land or grounded shore ice 
20 4 8 SRC Snowy, rainy coastal conifer 
21 4 8 MBC Main boreal conifers 
22 4 7 SNB Snowy non-boreal conifer forest 
23 4 6 CDF Conifer/deciduous, snow persisting in winter 
24 4 4 TBC Temperate broadleaf/conifer forest: with deciduous and/or 
evergreen hardwood trees 
25 4 6 SDF Temperate -deciduous forest, snow persisting in winter 
26 4 4 TBF Temperate broadleaf forest: deciduous, semideciduous 
27 4 6 NSC Non-snowy conifer forest 
28 4 7 TMC Tropical montane complexes (tree & other) 
29 4 5 TBS Tropical broadleaf seasonal forest, with dry or cool season 
30 15 1 CFS Cool farmland & settlements 
31 15 1 MFS Mild/hot farmland & settlements 
32 4 4 RGD Rain-green (drought deciduous) forest 
33 4 4 TRF Tropical rainforest 
36 16 1 PRA Paddy rice and associated lands (part anaerobic) 
37 16 1 WCI Warm/hot crops with extensive irrigation 
38 16 1 CCI Cool crops with irrigation (variable extent) 
39 16 1 CCP Cold crops, pasture, irrigation 
40 2 5 CGS Cool (snowy) grass/shrub (including much 2) 
41 2 3 MGS Mild/warm/hot grass/shrub 
42 2 6 CSM Cold steppe/meadow + / -  larch, scrub 
43 2 2 SGW Savanna/grass, seasonal woods; savanna belts 
44 8 6 MBF Mire, -cold peatland: sphagnum, grass-like and/or dwarf 
shrub 
45 8 6 MOS Marsh or other swamp (warm-hot) salty/freshwater marsh, 
thicket 
46 3 3 MES Mediterranean evergreen tree/scrub (winter rainfall) 
47 3 4 DHS Dry or highland scrub/tree (juniper, etc.) 
48 4 4 DEW Dry evergreen woodland or low forest (mainly Australia, S. 
America) 
49 13 7 W I  Hot-mild volcanic 'islands' (variable veg.) 
50 1 9 SDB Sand desert, partly blowing 
51 1 6 SDS Semidesert/desert scrub/succulent/sparse grass 
52 1 7 CSS Cool/cold shrub semidesert/steppe (sagebrush . . . )  
53 12 9 TUN Tundra (polar, alpine) 
54 4 4 TER Temperate evergreen rainforest (major forest and woodland) 
55 14 3 SFW Snowy field/woods complex 
56 14 3 FFR Forest/field complex with regrowth after disturbances 
57 14 4 SFF Snowy forest/field, commonly openings are pasture and/or 
mires 
58 14 2 FWG Field/woods with grass and/or cropland 
59 3 7 STW Succulent and thorn woods 
60 12 6 SDT Southern dry taiga (and other aspen/birch, etc.) 
61 12 7 LT Larch taiga with deciduous conifer 
62 12 6 NMT Northern or maritime taiga/tundra 
63 12 4 WTM Wooded tundra margin (or mt. scrub, meadow) 
64 8 5 HMW Heath and moorland, wild or artificial (grazed) 
65 13 5 CNW Coastal: NW quadrant near most land 
66 13 5 CNE Coastal: NE quadrant near most land 
67 13 5 CSE 
68 13 5 CSW 
69 11 9 PDL 
70 11 9 GLA 
71 1 8 SSF 
72 9 8 MSM 
73 13 6 ISL 
74 13 8 WAT 
75 11 9 UND 
Coastal: SE quadrant near most land 
Coastal: SW quadrant near most land 
Polar desert with rock Lichens 
Glaciers (other polar and alpine) 
Salt/soda flats (playas, lake flats rarely wet) 
Mangrove swamp/mudflat (Africa only) 
Islands and shore waters in oceans and/or lakes 
Water (water/land complex) 
Not defined 
# AGGREGATE ECOSYSTEMS CLASSES 
1 DESERT Cold and hot deserts, bare land, salt flats, etc. 
2 GRASS Various types of grass and shrub land 
3 SHR/FO . . . . . .  Various types of scrubs and woodland 
4 FOREST . . . . . .  Various types of evergreen and deciduous forests 
8 SWAMP ....... Mires, marshes, swamps, heath and moorland 
9 MANGR ....... Mangrove swamps 
11 WAT/GL . . . . . .  Water, glaciers, antarctic ice, polar deserts 
12 TND/TG . . . . . .  Various tundra and taiga areas 
13 COASTL ...... Coastal areas 
14 FRM/FO ...... Various farm/forest classes 
15 FRM-D . . . . . . .  Dryland farming areas 
16 FRM-IR . . . . . .  Irrigated farmland areas 
Appendix 2: Balance of land with cultivation potential 
Explanations to Table 6 and Table 6B: 
For estimating the balance of remaining land with crop production potential we started by 
assessing the extents of land where climate, soils and landform were sufficiently suitable for 
cultivation of at least one major crop (labeled 'Gross'), subtracting from these land units areas 
under legal protection (shown as 'Protected'). Land required for habitation and infrastructure 
is estimated using 1990 population levels (shown as 'Habit 90'), and by subtracting we form 
the net amount of land with cultivation potential (shown as 'Net'). From this we subtract land 
known to be used for agriculture (shown as 'Cultivated'. The data are from FAOSTAT (FAO, 
1996) and FAO's AT2010 (FAO, 1995) study; data for China have been compiled by the 
IIASA Land-Use Change Project. This allows to form the balance of land with rainfed crop 
production potential which is not yet under such use (shown as 'Balance'). The next task was 
to identify the amount of forest and wetland ecosystems (i.e., aggregate ecosystems classes 4, 
8 and 9) within this balance. To achieve this, the result from overlaying the Global 
Ecosystems database (Kineman&Ohrenschall, 1992) onto the land resources inventory was 
applied. The meaning of the respective rows in Table 6 and Table 6B is the following: 
% Forest & Wetland ... percentage of forest and wetland ecosystems classes in respective 
land class 
Forest & Wetland ........ extent of forest and wetland in the balance of each land class 
Other ........................... extent of other ecosystems classes in each land class 
For instance, in South America some 714,097 thousand ha of land with cultivation potential 
are assessed as being still available out of a total of 963,525 thousand ha, i.e., 74.1 percent of 
the total land with cultivation potential is currently not used for crop cultivation. More than 
two thirds of this, 68.8 percent, are classified as forest or wetland in the global ecosystems 
database. 
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Table 6B: Estimated balance of land with rainfed cultivation potential (cont.) 
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